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ABSTRACT 
Inspired by Egypt’s recent uprising against former president Hosni 
Mubarak and its resulting hybrid regime, this research seeks to distinguish 
disparities between the content and tonality of an Egyptian state-owned online 
English language publication and one that is independently owned. I assign scores 
to one hundred and twenty articles, sixty published by Al-Ahram and sixty 
published by Egypt Independent, based on negativity towards the Brotherhood 
during Morsi’s reign and after it ended. Both the character of the paper as well as 
time period serves as independent variables. The dependent variable, negativity 
displayed towards the Brotherhood, is categorized based on their security, 
political and cultural values. Findings reveal that Al-Ahram is significantly more 
negative towards the Brotherhood than Egypt Independent only during the period 
of Islamist rule, suggesting that state-owned papers do not always operate in favor 
of the ruling regime. The difference in negativity between Egypt Independent and 
Al-Ahram decreases four-fold after Morsi is removed from office. This is a result 
of Egypt Independent’s increased negativity towards the Brotherhood’s security 
values. In conclusion, the character of the newspaper is a more accurate predictor 
of negativity during the Brotherhood period while time period is a more accurate 
predictor of negativity for Egypt Independent. The convergence of negativity 
scores after Morsi was ousted prompts further research on the possible decline in 
journalistic objectivity among independent papers as well as the role of state-
owned papers in Islamist and non-Islamist, secular regimes.
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INTRODUCTION 
The “Arab Spring” has been characterized as a Middle Eastern 
phenomenon that has “unleashed the forces of emancipation and spirits of social 
justice that swept across the region with unprecedented speed, ferocity, and joy” 
(Amar and Prashad 2013, vii). These turbulent and relatively rapid political 
transitions result in neither immediate democracy nor immediate autocracy. 
Measuring the ways in which these new, genre-defiant political regimes shape the 
media environment and influence media dynamics is a difficult but necessary 
task. Such research has the potential to double as an aid to greater consistency in 
freedom of press and speech around the world. Analyzing the media’s 
representation of its nation’s political atmosphere also broadens our 
comprehension of the ways in which certain media systems function under a 
robust set of circumstances. Furthermore, the uncertainty but momentous 
currency surrounding Arab Spring nations deems the research not only 
compelling, but also pertinent to better understanding media dynamics in our 
globalized world. This is especially the case for Egypt and its largest Islamist 
group, the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Egypt has earned the name, “Mother of the World,” among its people 
because of its long, rich history. Much of the nation’s more recent political history 
is centered on the rise and fall of Islamist power (Amar and Prashad 2013, 26). 
Less than a year after Mohamed Morsi was elected president under the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, the Brotherhood 
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experienced one of the most intense crackdowns since the 1950s. A.K. Yildirim, 
Furman University professor and political Islam scholar, stated in his article on 
the future of democracy in Egypt, “This brief but intense episode of Egyptian 
politics in the last two years shattered any appearance of a genuine democratic 
transition” (2013, 65).  
It follows that in totality Egypt is not fully democratic or fully 
authoritarian, especially in its current state under the tight surveillance of the 
military. For this reason, nations in political limbo, so to speak, have been labeled 
as “hybrid.” A hybrid regime is a "political gray zone,” that is characterized 
somewhere between “full-fledged democracy” and “outright dictatorship" 
(Carothers 2002, 9). The hybrid regime’s gray zone status has made it 
synonymous with other terms such as “pseudo-democracy” and “electoral 
authoritarianism” (Diamond 2002, 22).    
Although the term is not new, the Arab Spring has made it increasingly 
relevant to certain Middle Eastern nations such as Egypt, which turned a new 
political leaf less than five years ago when Mubarak was toppled. At the time of 
Morsi’s election, the Muslim Brotherhood openly acknowledged that Islamic 
governance is “best achieved through free and fair elections,” suggesting a 
national shift towards liberalism (Rutherford 2013, 237). However, numerous 
loopholes permitting unilateral decision-making on behalf of the president remain 
in Egypt, in spite of the presence of free and fair elections. In turn, these 
exceptions undermine the growth of liberalism. For example, Egypt sustains a 
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“vast array of laws that regulate the formation and actions of political parties, civil 
society groups, and the press (238). For this reason, the Brotherhood must run 
under a technically nonreligious platform, hence its political wing, the Freedom 
and Justice Party. Moreover, Egypt’s leader can declare a state of emergency, 
giving him the authority to executively refute laws that protect the basic freedoms 
of citizens, quickly silence opposition, and increase police power and censorship 
of media (238).  Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt has been under 
emergency law intermittently. It was re-declared most recently in August 2013, 
when conflict between Brotherhood supporters and the military broke out on the 
streets (Reynolds 2013, 1).  
Based upon recent history, it is evident that the media dynamics of this 
politically turbulent nation have been influenced by multiple transitions and 
fluctuating Islamist power. To evaluate these dynamics, I measure the ways in 
which journalistic objectivity in Egypt has changed according to two main 
independent variables.   
The first independent variable is character of the newspaper, which is 
defined by its status as independent or state owned. The second independent 
variable is time period, which is determined by whether the article of interest was 
published during Morsi’s reign or afterwards. I hope to determine whether both or 
either of these factors is an indicator of Egyptian media’s portrayal of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in either a negative, neutral, or positive light.  
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Out of the pool of “Arab Spring” and “hybrid” nations, Egypt was chosen 
in particular for a few important reasons. Firstly, Egypt is the largest nation in the 
Arab region, and is also historically significant. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
who ruled from 1956 until 1970, was revered as a regional leader of Arab 
nationalism after defeating Israel and regaining power over the Suez Canal, a 
major trade station (Habeeb 2012, 3). The Egyptian government has undergone 
multiple political transitions since late 2011, the first of which began with the 
election of the Muslim Brotherhood and evolved into its being officially 
characterized as a “terrorist organization” by the current military-run state 
(Habeeb 2012, 12). After Mubarak was ousted in December 2011, Morsi was 
elected by popular vote. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ General el-
Sisi forced Morsi to resign from office just a short year later after protests 
concerning his efficacy as a democratic leader erupted across the nation (Habeeb 
2012, 15).  
I chose to focus more intently on one specific Egyptian Islamist group— 
the Muslim Brotherhood– as opposed to observing a broader scope of Islamist 
groups because of the Brotherhood’s persistent and complicated involvement in 
Egyptian history. The Brotherhood has been operating in Egypt since the 1920s 
and has spread to other nations under different nomenclature since then. Although 
it has remained present in Egypt at the societal level, its official political 
operations have been banned and cracked down upon intermittently (Nada and 
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Thompson 2012, 147). Interestingly, the rapid rise and fall of the Brotherhood in 
Egypt during the past several years reflects this historical trend.  
The two papers of interest are Al-Ahram, a majority state-owned 
publication, and Egypt Independent, an independent publication. Both papers are 
accessible online and are either translated from Arabic to English or written 
originally in English. Al-Ahram was founded in 1875 and is Egypt’s largest and 
oldest news organization. After Nasser nationalized the press in 1960, Al-Ahram 
earned a reputation as the mouthpiece of the Egyptian government (Encyclopedia 
Britannica 2014). Egypt Independent, on the contrary, was founded in November 
2011 and stemmed from its parent company, Al-Masry Al-Youm. Egypt 
Independent’s reputation has been called into question in recent years.  
 Al-Masry Media Corporation ceased the publication’s print version after 
accusations that the parent company, Al-Masry Al-Youm, was self-censoring 
Egypt Independent material. The accusations and subsequent closure of its print 
version exemplifies the unguaranteed objectivity of the independent paper and the 
external pressures affecting it (Egypt Independent 2013).  
The journalistic portrayal of the nation’s political state has inevitably been 
influence by political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, 
the Freedom and Justice Party, and the currently ruling Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF). Information flow targeted for foreign nations, as well as 
for the domestic population, holds significant potential in a context where citizens 
in previously authoritarian nations are beginning to gain more power.  
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Media is a powerful weapon in the hands of an authoritarian state, a 
dissenting party, or the collective people. The status quo interpretations, formed 
by the party in power, tug journalists one way, while competing power contributes 
an opposite force, complicating the way media portrays a nation to the rest of the 
world. Though this system appears to be a simple game of tug of war based upon 
partisan influence exercised at the expense of journalistic objectivity, the two 
opposing forces are often accompanied by other parties or interest groups, each of 
which are vying for power. To complicate the game further, each side has 
different motives for attempting to control what information is made transparent.  
 In the case of Egypt, as well as other nations in the region, Islamists have 
gained considerable power. As opposed to being banned altogether from 
governmental spheres, they are being more widely accepted as participants in 
them (Schwedler 2013, 10). Scholars have attempted to explain Islamists’ rise to 
power with various theories that touch on these political groups’ impressive 
organizational structure, ability to provide public goods that the regime cannot or 
will not provide, religious or ideological tenets, and promises that democracy will 
rise from of the ashes of civil conflict (Wegner 2011, 232).  
The rise of Islamists in government bodies is controversial not only 
domestically, but also internationally as countries around the world take into 
account the implications for foreign aid and foreign relations. Google Trends 
shows that the third highest number of Google searches for “Muslim 
Brotherhood” come from the United States, suggesting that the English language 
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publication of Egypt Independent and Al-Ahram is loosely geared towards 
Americans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Regional Interest” of search term: “Muslim Brotherhood” 
Source: Google Trends 
 
 
 
This interconnectedness, made possible by globalization, further emphasizes the 
importance of observing not only Egyptian media geared towards the domestic 
audience, but also Egyptian media geared towards an American audience. With 
this rise of Islamists in government, which is relatively recent, Islamist extremist 
groups have become a worldwide concern after a series of terrorist attacks shook 
the western world. Media outlets are naïvely eager to conflate Islam and militancy 
under the inappropriate guise of “extremism”, and certain regimes have engrained 
similar associations to protect their own legitimacy and suppress threatening 
challenges to power. In semi-authoritarian nations in particular, a common 
	  8	  
problem is that “the political elite, whether in the government, opposition parties, 
or even civil society organizations, has great difficulty reaching the rest of the 
society (Olcott and Ottaway 1999, 14).  
 In contrast to the claims of repressive regimes who perceive Islamists as a 
threat to power, Islamists across the Middle East have attempted to coopt 
democratic values, regardless of interior motivations and special interests 
associated with doing so (Schwedler 2013, 8). Although Americans pay great 
attention to the tragic fates befalling western journalists abroad, the ways in which 
English language media, produced by Middle Eastern journalists, is compromised 
by political parties and threats of detainment has not been studied in depth. 
Additionally, analysis of Egypt’s media dynamics will contribute to a world map 
of media environments that exist under varying political conditions. In this thesis, 
I hope to provide a small albeit narrow window of insight into how and why news 
is shaped in Egypt and whether level of objectivity can be correlated with the 
character of the paper or the party in power.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  9	  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This review’s primary purpose is to contextualize the dynamics of 
Egyptian news media regarding the Muslim Brotherhood and the varying political 
conditions surrounding that news. On a broader scale, it will highlight the relative 
lack of research focusing on the media environments in hybrid nations.  Egypt’s 
case will be framed as a potential foil to the media effects model representative of 
stable, democratic nations such as the United States, as well as more authoritarian 
ones. A large body of research has contributed to characterizing media 
environments under conditions defined by liberalized media and democratic, 
political stability. Likewise, political scientists have devoted much time to 
uncovering the shape of media under authoritarian rule (James and Whittenn-
Woodring 2012, 115).  However, Egypt’s position between democracy and 
military authoritarian regime suggests that under these alternative conditions, the 
objectivity of its journalism will not fall neatly into either prominent category. 
That being said, it is important to assess the state of media in nations undergoing 
transition and to do so, we must first understand the relationship between media 
and government and how they affect each other.  
Although both democratic and authoritarian media environments will be 
observed as points of comparison, my research does not attempt to define a new 
universal set of media dynamics for hybrid nations. Instead, given the limitations 
on time and resources as well as the narrow scope of research, I will explore 
Egypt’s media dynamics under the current conditions with the intention of 
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contributing a small piece to the puzzle of media environments around the world, 
which exist under many different circumstances.  
A comparative analysis of media systems worldwide will highlight the 
ways in which Egyptian media operates under an individualized set of political 
constraints and market conditions. Furthermore, isolating the political and 
commercial circumstances that distinguish the Egyptian media landscape from 
more definitive categorizations will encourage greater overarching questions. 
These questions will explore the ways in which a pluralized media scene does not 
necessarily imply liberalization or journalistic objectivity and whether or not 
media dynamics are environmentally specific.  
Any question or topic housed under the umbrella of “media” derives its 
rudimentary importance from the assumption that media is also significantly 
influential in the political sphere. Media is “vital to the creation and vitality of 
civil society; without it, freedom of communication, and thus the foundation of 
democratic rule, is undermined” (O’Neil 1998, 2). Before setting out to define the 
degree to which external forces impact the content and tone of news, I justify the 
significance of news media itself and its ability to shape public opinion even in 
the most liberal of societies.  This analysis will also double as an overview of the 
democratic media environment.  
In research done on American media and how it operates in a democratic 
setting, scholars often cite the Minimal Effects Model. In his book entitled The 
Effects of Mass Communication, Joseph Klapper defines the Minimal Effects 
	  11	  
Model, which lasts from 1948 to about 1960. It suggests that instead of changing 
opinion, media propaganda is more likely to reinforce predispositions and prior 
attitudes (Klapper 1960, 120).  
Persuasion was subsequently broken down into an equation, where its 
possibility equals the product of the probability of exposure to a message and the 
probability that it is accepted (McGuire 1964, 330). Political awareness and 
attitude change are inversely correlated; therefore, citizens in the middle of the 
awareness spectrum are most vulnerable to attitude change. Additionally, the 
implications are somewhat unsettling since they suggest that the most intelligent 
people, who tend to be the most politically aware, are also the most resistant to 
new information.  
The theory of selective exposure rationalizes the troubling dichotomy 
between message reception and acceptance.  In their paper, “Selective Exposure 
to Information,” David Sears and Jonathan Freedman define selective exposure as 
“any systematic bias in audience composition” (1963, 195). In other words, 
individuals, either intentionally or unintentionally, expose themselves to media 
that agrees with predispositions such as partisanship, gender, educational status, 
interest, and involvement. Disparities in accessibility to digital and print media 
that are both dissident and affirmative of authority must be considered in order for 
selective exposure to occur. If a country blocks particular opinions from being 
expressed publicly, selective exposure will be more difficult to achieve in a 
repressive environment.  
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The media effects model of democratic America is foiled by that of 
authoritarian governments who intercede in the flow of information to the public. 
They “seek, on one side, to fill the mass media with a steady stream of pro-
government messages and, on the other, to stifle independent criticism and 
analysis” (Geddes and Zaller 1989, 340). Geddes and Zaller examine patterns of 
regime support in Brazil to reveal how effectively authoritarian governments 
shape political attitudes. They found that those who are exposed to media but 
have high levels of political awareness (have already established political 
predispositions) are most likely to resist government-issued propaganda. Those 
with low levels of political sophistication rarely expose themselves to media; 
hence, they bypass any possibility of being persuaded by it. On the other hand, 
those who expose themselves to media and are moderately politically 
sophisticated are most vulnerable to being persuaded. This model is congruous 
with the possibility of persuasion equation set up by McGuire (McGuire 1964). 
Thus, Geddes and Zaller conclude that the Brazilian opinion formation model, 
representative of authoritarian nations, conforms to the process of opinion 
formation in democratic countries (1989, 346). It seems as though polar opposite 
political regimes shape public opinion with equal success.  
Now I will transition into a general analysis of the Egyptian media 
environment, which exists in a hybrid nation, to highlight the ways it does not fit 
the established “democratic” or “authoritarian” conditions. Mubarak’s 
inauguration in 1981 marks a significant transition towards a more liberal, albeit 
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intermittently restrictive Egyptian media environment.  After a few months in 
office, he freed journalists and opposition leaders from prison and allowed 
oppositional papers that had been silenced under Sadat to resume publication. 
Soon, these opposition papers outnumbered those directly controlled by the state 
(Rugh 2004, 200). However, the regime continues, even today, to use Anti-
Terrorist Laws as an excuse to exercise unchecked restrictions on media 
supportive of the Islamist insurgency. Although the state cannot directly censor 
private media sources, it can intensify penal codes for journalists whose 
publications are liable to being vaguely accused of “disrupting social peace” or 
“spreading panic” (Rugh 2004, 158).  Although there are little official regulations 
on content, journalists who accuse the military regime remain vulnerable to legal 
challenges, which may increase self-censorship.  
In his report on post-revolution Egyptian media policy, Mendel, human 
rights NGO director, points out that informal censorship pathways and conditional 
intensification of press restrictions in states of emergency combine in a “complex 
system of control” (Mendel 2011, 1).  Though the existence of independent media 
sources should entail an overall more liberalized media environment, the “margin 
of freedom allowed for the media has been constantly widening and shrinking, as 
it oscillates between the poles of press freedom and government repression” 
(Khamis 2008, 262). For example, even though Mubarak exploited the value of 
free media, he sentenced a blogger to four years in prison, simply for insulting the 
President and making “anti-Islamic” remarks (Weyman 2007, 2). Mendel attests 
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that media repression is heightened when the government is highly focused on 
opposing the Islamist insurgency and that even though prior security officials and 
members of the Supreme Press Council have been forced out of office in the last 
decade, “clear red lines remain,” especially in terms of reporting on authority 
(Mendel 2011, 2).  
In her comparative analysis of media systems, Sahar Khamis, expert on 
Arab and Muslim media, calls Egypt’s media landscape “pluralistic and 
paradoxical” (2008, 259). Although access to and participation in media has 
become technically democratized due to absence of official content censorship 
laws, Egypt’s political institutions do not reflect that of a true democracy. Khamis 
goes on to reference Hallin and Mancini’s three media models that claim to be 
universally representative of “democratized” nations. The Polarized Pluralist 
model— the most relevant to this analysis— is exemplary of nations that have 
recently undergone democratization and promote state control over media (Hallin 
and Mancini 2004, 189). The independent variables observed to construct this 
definition include the structure of media markets, political parallelism, journalistic 
professionalism, and the role of the state. Khamis suggests that Egypt cannot be 
categorized according to these models due to its recent authoritarian history and 
incomplete transition into democracy (2008, 260).  
Taking ownership of media into account, however, may yield some 
results. Democratization and character (ownership) of publication have been 
measured extensively as independent variables that influence media freedom. A 
	  15	  
journal article titled “Who owns the media?”, which observes media ownership in 
ninety-seven nations worldwide, finds a negative correlation between government 
ownership of media and media freedom (Djankov et. al 2003, 372). This does not 
mean that independent news outlets represent the epitome of media freedom. The 
study lists dependence on government subsidies, reliance upon government for 
sources, and laws restricting reporting as reasons why independent news outlets 
might self-censor themselves (Djankov et. al 2003, 369).  
After this study was published, another set of researchers addressed the 
need to gather data on the relationship between government and media in 
transitioning countries. “Much of what we know about the relationship between 
news media and government comes from studying the United States, so we need 
to learn more about other countries, especially developing and non-democratic 
states” (James and Whittenn-Woodring 2012, 115).  Specifically, fulfillment of 
media’s watchdog role and level of democracy were measured as indicators of 
government repression in various nations. The findings suggested that when a 
media source is independent and democracy is absent, level of government 
repression is equivalent to the case where the media source is dependent upon the 
government and democracy is present. This suggests a “tradeoff effect,” meaning 
that both conditions, democracy and independent press, should be present in order 
to maximize media freedom (James et. al 2012, 129).  
In the United States, there is a plethora of media outlets and platforms 
accompanied by a relative lack of censorship. Conversely, Egypt’s media 
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environment is significantly more restrictive, by means of its strict penal laws that 
encourage self-censorship and threaten imprisonment. In conclusion, the shorter 
analysis of Egypt’s past media policies and oscillating degrees of state repression 
directly contextualizes how its state of political unrest separates it from more 
democratic media models, such as that of the United States. As a result, the 
review as a whole highlights the intertwining of political conditions and media 
environments and how they are related on a larger scale. Similarly, an analysis of 
Egypt’s media model under a hybrid regime will instigate further studies on 
nations where Islamists have gained power and governments are in the process of 
transitioning.  
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HYPOTHESES  
 
 
Table 1 
 
Egypt Independent Al-Ahram  
Brotherhood Period 
July 2012 & January 2013 Μ 1 Μ3 
Post-Brotherhood Period  
July 2013 & January 2014 Μ 2 Μ 4 
 
*Where Μx represents the mean rating for negativity towards the Brotherhood for 
a cohort of thirty articles  
 
Mohamed Morsi was democratically elected as Egypt’s president on June 30th, 
2012 (BBC News Africa 2015). Sixty articles, thirty from Al-Ahram and thirty 
from Egypt Independent, are taken from the time during which Morsi was 
president. For each publication, fifteen articles were published in July 2012 and 
fifteen articles were published in January 2013.  
 
On July 3rd, 2013, Morsi fell from power after protests erupted and General el-Sisi 
led a military coup d’état that resulted in the resignation of the nation’s first 
democratically elected president. El-Sisi officially assumed presidential office on 
June 8th, 2014 and has held this place since (BBC News Africa 2015). Sixty 
articles, thirty from Al-Ahram and thirty from Egypt Independent, are taken from 
the time during which Morsi was not in power. For each publication, fifteen 
articles were published in July 2013 and fifteen articles were published in January 
2014. 
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There are eight hypotheses in total. They are separated into four sections, 
according to sets of varying comparisons between paper, time period, and 
subcategory rating. Each set of hypotheses is followed by an explanation, which 
references scholarly sources as well as citizen journalist accounts, providing 
support for my expectations.  
 
 
 
 
SET I: DIFFERENCES ACROSS PAPERS  
 
This set of three hypotheses pertains to discrepancies in negativity demonstrated 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood across the two papers and the two time periods.  
 
H1: Al-Ahram will be, overall, more negative towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
than Egypt Independent is in both time periods. 
 
Μ 3 < Μ1 
 
Μ4 < Μ2 
  
 
H2: The difference in negativity towards the Brotherhood between Al-Ahram and 
Egypt Independent will vary according to time period. The difference will be 
larger during the Brotherhood Period.  
 
|Μ3 – Μ1| > |Μ4- Μ2| 
 
 
H3: In both time periods, Al-Ahram will be more negative towards the 
Brotherhood’s political, security, and cultural values than Egypt Independent is. 
From one time period to the next, the largest subcategorical differences between 
papers will be demonstrated by political ratings and security ratings.  
 
[Μ 3 < Μ1] Politics, Security, & Culture  
 
[Μ 4 < Μ2] Politics, Security, & Culture  
 
[|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Politics > [|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Culture 
 
[|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Security > [|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Culture 
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SET I EXPLANATION 
 
Egypt Independent, as its name suggests, is an independent publication that 
considers itself a “strong voice of independent and progressive journalism” 
(Egypt Independent 2013, 1). It follows that Egypt Independent should have 
institutional allegiance to neither the Supreme Council of Armed Forces nor the 
Brotherhood’s political wing, and will therefore, remain neutral. On the contrary, 
Al-Ahram is majority owned by the state of Egypt (Encyclopedia Britannica 2014, 
1). Thus, it is logical that Al-Ahram will be pressured by the state to criticize the 
Brotherhood to a larger degree in order to support the former military order 
enacted by SCAF and by el-Sisi. The consistent repression of media by the 
military, even under Morsi, will provide further validation of the hypotheses 
made.  
In her book, Transformations in Egyptian Journalism, Naomi Sakr says 
that media repression was marked by the “retention of the old government 
controlled press,” which is pioneered by Al-Ahram, “military summons and 
prosecutions for coverage unfavorable to SCAF,” and accusations that journalists 
were working towards “foreign agendas” (2013, vii). Although the Brotherhood 
was in power for a short time during the post-Mubarak period, the repressive 
measures seem to be primarily attributed to the military, or SCAF.  
Moreover, Morsi’s approximate one year in office was not an adequate 
duration of time to exercise significant influence over Al-Ahram or Egypt 
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Independent, neither of which I suspect will cover the Brotherhood in a positive 
light. The former editor of Egypt Independent and current editor of its sister 
paper, Mada-Masr, explained repression by the military in an interview with the 
trilingual web portal, Qantara. She claims that the military has consistently 
controlled the media since Mubarak’s ousting in 2011 and that in areas where 
violence and destruction are prevalent, the state is the only source of first hand 
news. She adds that although the Brotherhood appointed members of the Shura 
Council, who in turn appoints editor-in-chiefs of state papers, the changes were 
only “cosmetic” and “didn’t reach the core of these institutions”  (Hagmann 2013, 
1).  Accordingly, I expect that Egypt Independent sought, at the time, to provide 
an alternative to the status quo source of news, which is liable to being both 
limited and politically biased according to institutional allegiances.  
Based on Al-Ahram’s closer relationship to the state and Egypt Independent’s 
conscious decision to reflect independence and therefore, objectivity, I 
hypothesize that Al-Ahram’s coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood will be more 
negative than Egypt Independent’s across both time periods. Although appointees 
with Islamist affiliations dominate the Shura Council, state-owned publications 
will have already been more accustomed to supporting SCAF, who set up the 
elections won by Morsi and subsequently by el-Sisi.  
A New York Times article explores Al-Ahram’s immediate undercutting of 
Morsi shortly after his election to office. It claims that Egypt’s state media is “at 
war” with the new president yet continues to “honor” him as the first freely 
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elected president (Kirkpatrick and El-Sheikh 2012, 1). The contradictory albeit 
primarily negative coverage of Morsi supports Attalah’s claim that the military 
retains control over media.  
Demonstrative of its bias, the only Al-Ahram article that focused on Morsi’s 
decision to recall Parliament was one-sided. As opposed to suggesting that 
democratization inevitably adopting some power at the military’s expense so that 
decisions can be made independent of the military, Al-Ahram focuses only on the 
negative effects the decision had on the economy (Kirkpatrick and El-Sheikh 
2012, 1). The negative attribution to Morsi encourages readers to believe that 
Egypt’s president is making decisions unilaterally and these decisions ultimately 
detriment the nation. In turn, this decision-making process can be interpreted as a 
deviation from the democratic system. Furthermore, Islamists may be associated 
with a disruption of Egypt’s political transition into democracy.  
Similar political scenarios insinuate that a delicate balance remains 
between military authority and Islamist authority. This power struggle explicates 
the state’s desire to delegitimize the Brotherhood via media. As mentioned earlier, 
Morsi re-appointed the People’s Assembly, thereby violating the prior court 
ruling that called for its disintegration (Rashwan 2012, 1). In his blog, “Informed 
Comment,” University of Michigan Professor of History Juan Cole explained the 
power struggle.  He says it was “intended to give SCAF the right to appoint and 
oversee the constituent assembly that will draft the new constitution, so as to be in 
a position to safeguard the prerogatives of the military and to forestall a total 
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Islamization of the constitution” (2012, 1). Given the sensitivity surrounding the 
struggle between Islamists and the military, there will be a primary emphasis, at 
least content-wise, on politics.  
Likewise, I expect an equal emphasis on security and large differences in 
security ratings between the two papers across time periods. Egypt’s State 
Information Service Website, which features the continuously scrolling phrase 
“Egypt on democratic track,” quotes el-Sisi. He says, “those followers of the 
Islamist current are in need of effort, knowledge and rehabilitation in the coming 
critical stage” (State Information Service 2014). He also expresses a dedication to 
“establishing regional stability and security in our Arab nation” (State Information 
Service 2014). The speech was made just weeks following Morsi’s removal from 
office. The pending acknowledgment of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organization, as well as el-Sisi’s promises to bring about stability, suggest that 
media also focused heavily on security values during this pivotal period. 
In an article titled “The End of Reciprocity: The Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Security Sector,” K.M. Ennarah says the Brotherhood was “poised to play the 
role of the guarantor of democratic legitimacy and assimilation of newly 
politicized social groups at the same time: the necessary ingredients for stability 
in post-revolution Egypt” (2014, 416). Engaging such stability had always been 
an important initiative, especially given recent protests and subsequent clashes 
between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents. In December 2013, these 
values took on a new significance as the SCAF officially declared the Muslim 
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Brotherhood a terrorist organization (Wickham 2013, 162). In the military’s eyes, 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s power is antithetical to both stability and security. 
Emphasis on these values suggests higher coverage of the Brotherhood’s 
violations of them.  
Lastly, I hypothesize that differences in each publication’s representation 
of Morsi will be more pronounced during Morsi’s reign. I suspect that as the 
SCAF gained more power after ousting Morsi from office, Egypt Independent felt 
pressure to cover the Brotherhood in a more negative light as not to upset the 
military.   As a result, I suspect that Egypt Independent’s coverage of the Muslim 
Brotherhood will inch closer to that of Al-Ahram during the Post-Brotherhood 
period.  
 
 
SET II: DIFFERENCES ACROSS TIME PERIODS 
 
This set of two hypotheses pertains to discrepancies in negativity demonstrated 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood by each individual publication across two time 
periods. 
 
H4:  Negativity towards the Muslim Brotherhood will change across time periods.  
 
Μ2 ≠ Μ1  
 
Μ4 ≠ Μ3 
 
 
H5: Both Al-Ahram and Egypt Independent will become more negative in their 
overall coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Post-Brotherhood period. 
 
Μ2 < Μ1  
 
Μ4 < Μ3 
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H6: The political, security, and cultural scores of both Al-Ahram and Egypt 
Independent will become more negative in their coverage of the Muslim 
Brotherhood post-Morsi.  
 
Μ2 Political < Μ1Political 
 
Μ2 Security < Μ1Security  
 
Μ2 Cultural < Μ1 Cultural 
 
Μ4 Political < Μ3 Political 
 
Μ4 Security < Μ3 Security 
 
Μ4 Cultural < Μ3 Cultural  
 
 
 
 
SET II EXPLANATION 
 
Egypt Independent’s and Al-Ahram’s coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood 
during July 2013 and January 2014 should be more negative in tone compared to 
coverage published when Morsi was in office. This is rooted in claims that under 
el-Sisi, the level of repression resorted back to that of earlier years when Mubarak 
exercised authoritarian power over the political sphere (Sakr 2013, vi). Although 
Adly Mansour, not el-Sisi, served as interim president after Morsi’s ouster, el-Sisi 
had already begun building a constituency. El-Sisi’s victory over Islamist 
competition in the June 2014 elections represented Egypt’s political regression 
back to a nation ruled, albeit “democratically,” by the military (Sakr 2013, vii). 
Moreover, the Reporters without Borders’ “Egypt File” asserts that since Morsi’s 
2013 ouster, the military has been pushing a “Sisification” of the media and 
“conducting a witch-hunt against journalists working for media directly or 
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indirectly affiliated with the Moslem Brotherhood, which has been banned as a 
‘terrorist organization’ since 25 December” (2014, 2). In May 2014, Egyptian 
blogger Wael Abbas told Al-Jazeera that repression is at an all time high, 
suggesting that repression of journalists worsened after Morsi left office. He said, 
“Everyone broadcasts the same propaganda—there is no place for revolutionaries 
or Islamists, who are defamed as spies who want to destroy the country" (Reinl 
2014, 1).  Thus, I predict that self-censorship became more prevalent after 
Morsi’s ouster as a way to avoid intensifying government repression via the 
military’s authoritative measures.  
Additionally, el-Sisi was responsible for Morsi’s ousting. Hence, it is in 
his best interest to convince the public he is a better ruler. During these months, 
building a credible reputation as a viable candidate for the June 2014 elections 
was incredibly pertinent to el-Sisi’s future election to the presidency (Sakr 2013, 
vii). In order to build this reputation, el-Sisi branded himself as a man who would 
bring about stability and security to the nation (State Information Service 2014). 
The Brotherhood was officially declared a terrorist organization by the state on 
December 25th, 2013; therefore, it is likely that el-Sisi wanted to paint the 
Brotherhood as a threat to the values— stability and security— he supported.  
And after 2014 began, a New York Times opinion article revealed el-Sisi’s 
long-standing interest in “affecting” media. According to writer Marwan Bishara, 
Al-Jazeera leaked video footage of el-Sisi saying, “It takes a long time before 
you're able to affect and control the media.” He continued, “We are working on 
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this and we are achieving more positive results, but we have yet to achieve what 
we want” (2014, 1). This explicit intention to influence media was likely 
intensified as soon as Morsi was ousted from office.  
Egypt Independent’s shift towards negative coverage following the 
Brotherhood Period is exemplified by an event that occurred during the earlier 
2011 military interim period, after Mubarak was ousted and before Morsi was 
elected. A December 2011 edition of Egypt Independent was supposed to feature 
an opinion article written by Robert Springborg, political scientist and expert on 
Egyptian civilian-military relations. In the article, Springborg criticized the 
SCAF, but subsequently collaborated with the publication’s editors to omit any 
particularly offending comments. Although they diluted the piece’s original 
leanings, it was never published. Al-Masry Al-Youm, an independent publication 
from which Egypt Independent stems, later ran an article in the publication’s 
Arabic version, accusing Springborg of being a “conspirator against Egypt’s 
stability” (Yasin 2011, 1). Later, Egypt Independent’s staff commented, “Even 
after 25 January, self-censorship still plagues Egyptian media. As an Egyptian 
newspaper, we, too, suffer from it” (Egypt Independent 2011, 1).  
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SET III: DIFFERENCES AMONG SUBCATEGORIES 
 
This set of two hypotheses observes the discrepancies in negativity demonstrated 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood in each of three categories (political, security, 
and culture) across two publications and two time periods.  
 
 
 
H7: With time period and paper held constant in each of the 4 cases, political, 
security, and cultural ratings will not be equal. Political ratings and security 
ratings will be more negative than culture ratings.  
 
Μ1Political < Μ1Culture    and    Μ1Security < Μ1Culture 
 
Μ2Political < Μ2Culture    and    Μ2Security < Μ2Culture 
 
Μ3Political < Μ3Culture    and    Μ3Security < Μ3Culture 
 
Μ4Political < Μ4Culture    and    Μ4Security < Μ4Culture 
 
 
 
SET III EXPLANATION 
 
Coverage of topics relevant to political and security issues will be more 
negative than coverage related to culture issues simply because culture issues will 
be covered less frequently. As conveyed in the Set I and II explanations, politics 
and security will be the main focus. In other words, each hypothesis applies 
primarily to only two of the three categories. Significant hot button issues include 
the power struggle between the two parties, demonstrated by Morsi’s 
reappointment of the Shura Council and subsequent cooptation of some military 
power, and the court’s ensuing ruling that Morsi’s decision was unconstitutional 
(Rashwan 2012, 1). As for security, protests towards the end of Morsi’s truncated 
term were frequent and intense. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
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declared a “terrorist organization” by the state of Egypt on December 25th, 2013. 
This indicates an attempt on behalf of the SCAF to further delegitimize Morsi’s 
rule as a Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party member (Wickham 2013, 
162).  
Furthermore, I interpret the military’s own dialogue and suppression of 
dissenting forces exemplary of a desire to be perceived as delivering political 
stability and squashing the volatile Muslim Brotherhood, who had been declared a 
“terrorist organization” by the state. Thus, security and political issues will boast 
higher priority during the Post-Brotherhood Period than they did during Morsi’s 
reign.  
 
SET IV: OVERALL DIFFERENCES AMONG MEANS   
This set of hypotheses reveals the nature of the project in the lens of the largest 
scope by attempting to explain the broader picture by comparing each mean to 
the average of the other three.  
 
H8: The overall, political, and security scores of Egypt Independent during the 
Brotherhood Period and the overall, political, and security scores of Al-Ahram 
during the Post-Brotherhood Period will stand out significantly among the other 
90 respective scores. Egypt Independent’s overall, political, and security scores 
will be significantly more positive than the rest, while Al-Ahram’s overall, 
political, and security scores during the Post-Brotherhood period will be more 
negative than the rest.  
 
Μ1 > M (M2 + M3 + M4)  
 
M4 < M (M1 + M2 + M3)  
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SET IV EXPLANATION 
 
These will hold for the political and security categories, as well as the 
overall because, as explained above, I expect security and political issues to be of 
greatest concern to each publication. Egypt Independent during the Brotherhood 
Period and Al-Ahram during the Post-Brotherhood Period will stand out among 
the other categories because the former should be the most positive and the latter 
should be the most negative. In a sense, this last hypothesis is an extension of H1 
and H5.  
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DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
The data collected is intended to measure discrepancies in negativity 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood across paper and time period. On a larger scale, 
the comparisons will reveal which factors are pertinent to consider while 
predicting the press’ negativity towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Although 
causation cannot be ensured, correlation between negativity of an article and the 
character of the paper along with the time period during which the article was 
published may be implied. Negativity towards the Muslim Brotherhood will be 
referred to as the dependent variable, while character of paper and time period 
during which an article was published will be referred to as the two independent 
variables.  
Two publications in particular, both of which are English language 
Egyptian online newspapers, are of interest in this study. Al-Ahram is owned by 
the state, while Egypt Independent, as its title suggests, is an independent source 
of news. Al-Ahram has earned a reputation for being the “official” mouthpiece of 
the state, while Egypt Independent’s original staff has gone on to found and 
publish Mada-Masr, considered by American journalists to be the last existing 
“objective” source of news in Egypt (Chang 2015, 1). In consideration of its self-
awareness and clear initiative to be “objective,” Mada-Masr would have been an 
ideal selection in place of Egypt Independent. However, Mada-Masr did not begin 
publishing articles until 2013, which would have made the analysis of articles 
published during the Brotherhood Period impossible. Furthermore, Al-Ahram was 
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founded a century earlier than Egypt Independent (Encyclopedia Britannica 
2014).  The sharp contrast in age of the publication may prove to be 
representative of the discrepancies between more traditional and newer styles of 
journalism.  
Though these differences in each publication’s character potentially 
hamper their comparison as “equals,” they work to the project’s advantage 
because they represent opposite ends of the press spectrum. Hence, the inherent 
discrepancy in age and character of the papers provides a broader basis for 
making conclusions on any variance in the dependent variable.  
Articles published during two separate time periods are observed in an 
attempt to evaluate the extent to which Islamists and the military exercised power 
and influence over media. Both Al-Ahram and Egypt Independent articles 
published during the months of July 2012, January 2013, July 2013, and January 
2014 have been analyzed.  
Morsi was elected to the presidency on June 30th, 2012 and ousted on July 
3rd, 2013 (BBC News Africa 2015). Thus, articles dated in July 2012 and January 
2013 represent the beginning and middle point of the period during which the 
majority of the Egyptian government was comprised of Islamists. Although 
General el-Sisi was not formally elected to the presidency until June 8th, 2014, the 
military, led by el-Sisi, was in charge of the nation during the interim period and 
was responsible for organizing subsequent elections (BBC News Africa 2015). 
Articles dated in July 2013 and January 2014 represent this period of military 
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rule, at its beginning stages and approximate middle point. Military rule over the 
state eventually became more permanent upon el-Sisi’s victory in the June 2014 
elections.  
Al-Ahram articles, organized by the month they were published online, 
were obtained from the Lexis Nexis search engine, and sorted by relevancy to the 
search term, “Morsi OR Brotherhood.” Since religious parties are banned from 
participating in Egypt’s political sphere, Morsi could not run under the party 
platform, “Muslim Brotherhood.” Instead, he ran under the Freedom and Justice 
Party, a political party formed by Brotherhood members so that they could 
participate in government elections (Trager 2011, 1). Therefore, I deemed it 
necessary to include “Morsi” in the search box because of his connection with the 
FJP and less officially, the Muslim Brotherhood. “Brotherhood” was chosen 
instead of “Muslim Brotherhood” because it is a common abbreviated term used 
frequently by journalists to refer to the Islamist group. These choices in search 
terms were intended to maximize my collection of articles relevant to the 
Brotherhood’s rule.  
Egypt Independent articles published during July 2013 and January 2014 
were also available on Lexis Nexis and obtained by the same method as explained 
above. However, the academic search engine’s archive curiously contained no 
Egypt Independent articles published during the earlier months of Morsi’s rule. 
Egypt Independent articles published in July 2012 and January 2013 were instead 
retrieved from the publication’s website using the “advanced search” option to 
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sort by relevancy to the search term “’Brotherhood’ OR ‘Morsi’ OR ‘Morsy.’” 
Egypt Independent oftentimes spelled “Morsi” with a “y” whereas Al-Ahram did 
not, hence the minor difference in search terms.  
Articles are coded on a seven-digit scale of -3 to +3 with 0 representing a 
tone of neutrality and -3 representing maximum negativity in tone towards the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This coding scheme was applied to three categories: 
politics, security, and culture. Content falling in the realm of politics primarily 
entailed discussion of policy, elections, or the state of repair in post-revolution 
Egypt. Content relevant to security was gauged based on mentions of terrorism or 
violence occurring during protests, regardless of whether it was civilians or 
figures of authority that committed such acts.  Content applicable to culture was 
determined based on reference to social justice, women’s rights, detainment of 
journalists, and general wellbeing of the community. If article content lacked 
relevancy to any category, that category received a rating of “0.” The overall 
rating represents the sum of the three categories’ separate ratings. A key of 
adjectives that are perceived as either positive or negative in tone was not 
uniformly followed because I found that tone was determined more commonly on 
the basis of the presence or omission of conflicting viewpoints in each article. 
Instead, a positive or negative score of “1” represents the slightest bias, while a 
positive or negative score of “3” represents clear statements, made by the article’s 
author, that are unquestionably favorable or unfavorable of the Brotherhood or 
Morsi. These explicitly biased statements rarely occurred.  
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Coding articles on the basis of tonality is, inevitably, a subjective process. 
The development of a particular system for coding, used throughout the research 
process, ensured some consistency in the coding procedure. Articles from July 
2012 and January 2013 represent the period during which the Muslim 
Brotherhood is in power, while articles from July 2013 and January 2014 
represent the Post-Brotherhood Period. Thus, there are thirty articles per paper, 
per period. This system constitutes a sum of 120 articles in total. Each of the 120 
articles is coded according to the three mentioned categories.  
To better explain the coding process, I will provide a total of six examples 
illustrating how I determined a positive rating and a negative rating for each 
category.  
 
POLITICAL 
An Al-Ahram article titled “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood rejects new 
constitutional declaration” and published in July 2013 during the Post-
Brotherhood Period received a political rating of “-3”. Referring to the rejection 
of a political roadmap created by the interim President Adly Mansour, the article 
says, “Morsi gave himself wide powers and immunity from judicial oversight, 
effectively entrenching bitter polarisation in Egyptian politics, one of the main 
reasons millions of Egyptians had demonstrated in demand of early elections on 
30 June” (Ahram Online 2013).  Here, the authors, who are anonymous, clearly 
advocate the publication’s own subjective interpretation of Morsi’s rejection of 
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the roadmap as detrimental to the nation. This unfavorable interpretation 
pinpoints Morsi as the sole creator of political polarization in the nation. The 
statement, as well as the assumption that this type of behavior on behalf of Morsi 
led dissidents to protest on the streets, is unfounded and lacks quotes or facts to 
affirm it.   
 An Egypt Independent article titled “Morsy questions accomplishments of 
1952 revolution” and published in July 2012 during the Brotherhood Period 
received a political rating of “+2”. In each of the 120 articles, no author made 
statements that showed clear, explicit support of Morsi or the Brotherhood; 
therefore, no articles received a political rating of “+3”. This article suggests, 
however, that Morsi’s criticism of the revolution and its failure to establish 
democracy indicates an initiative on his part to make Egypt more democratic.  It 
hints support for Morsi indirectly by quoting an Egyptian citizen who warns 
Egyptian citizens from partaking in the celebration of the continuation of military 
rule. The author, who is anonymous, also references Egypt’s history of military-
backed rulers and intentionally mentions that Morsi is the first leader to not have a 
military background (Egypt Independent 2012). The article received a “+2” 
because it as favorable or hopeful of Morsi as it can be without directly saying so.  
 
SECURITY 
An Egypt Independent article titled “National Security Council: 
Brotherhood and allies bought arms from abroad” and published in July 2013 
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during the post-Brotherhood period received a security rating of “-3”. The article 
claims that investigations showed “the Brotherhood's plan was aimed to distort 
the military and paralyze the country with the bloodshed that it had planned,” and 
went on to associate the Brotherhood with “extremists” and “mask and armed 
terrorists” (Egypt Independent 2013). The explicit association between terrorism 
and the Brotherhood along with the sole placement of blame on the Brotherhood 
for deaths that occurred during clashes between Morsi supporters and Morsi 
opponents amounted the most negative security rating.  
Another Egypt Independent article titled “On 25 January, one anniversary 
but two commemorations” and published in January 2013 during the Brotherhood 
Period received a security rating of “+1”. The article begins by outlining a 
Brotherhood service campaign launched in honor of the beginning of the January 
2011 uprisings that led to Mubarak’s ousting (Rabie 2013).  On the contrary, 
Brotherhood opponents planned on taking to the street to protest Morsi’s 
performance as president. The juxtaposition of these two “commemorations” 
suggests that the Brotherhood is supporting stability and that the opposition is 
inciting violence. The article provides viewpoints that both criticize and support 
the Brotherhood’s decision and this relative balance erases the possibility of the 
article’s receiving a “+2” or a “+3”. Nonetheless, towards the end of the article, a 
Brotherhood member is quoted as insisting that the Brotherhood does not plan to 
incite violence against protestors. This positive “last word,” so to speak, justifies a 
slightly positive rating. 
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CULTURE 
 An Egypt Independent article titled “Copts wait to see what Morsy's rule 
will bring” and published in July 2012 during the Brotherhood period received a 
culture rating of “-2”.  A student at Cairo University expresses concern that the 
Brotherhood will enforce Sharia. “If so, we'll be back in the Middle Ages — we 
will see only covered women with almost no rights, like in Saudi Arabia, for 
example,” he said. “What we need is a civilized country, and I’m scared that the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsy won’t bring that to us” (Nguyen 
2012).  The reference to the “Middle Ages” and deviation from a “civilized 
country” suggests cultural backwardness. Since this is expressed by a source and 
not by the author directly, the article received a considerably negative score of “-
2”.  
 Another Egypt Independent article titled “Living on borrowed time: 
Morsy's political economics” and also published in July 2012 during the 
Brotherhood period received a culture rating of “+2”. The article explains the 
implications of a new social allowance raise for public sector workers. The 
articles quotes supporters of the incentive and those who believe it will lead to 
inflation; however, such criticism of the plan does not attack the character of the 
Brotherhood itself (Marroushi 2012). The author goes on to include the insight of 
a Brotherhood member who claims the raise will help thousands of citizens. 
Though some sources disapproved of the plan, the dissent was never presented as 
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an argument against the Brotherhood’s values or a claim that those values are 
backwards.  
 
RELIABILITY 
The employment of two additional coders improved reliability and guided 
me in refining my own coding process. Furthermore, I recoded a third of the 
articles two months after the initial coding session to evaluate and improve, when 
necessary, my own consistency in coding. Initially, two students were hired to 
code 20 articles each. The 20 articles were selected randomly from each paper and 
time period. They were copied and pasted into a document with the date and 
paper name omitted from each article to avoid possible preconceptions among the 
coders. To ensure clarity of methodology and consistent level of background 
knowledge, the coders also received a synopsis of Egypt’s political situation as of 
2011, along with an explanation of what type of content fits under each category. 
Upon receiving the results, I arranged meetings with the coders to gain a better 
understanding of the discrepancies in our ratings. For example, if a coder rated a 
particular article as positive and I had rated it as very negative, I asked him or her 
to explain their coding process for this single article. From there, I considered 
both viewpoints and altered my scoring methodology accordingly. Thus, I 
recoded three quarters of the articles. 
 One of these coders agreed to code another 20 articles, which were also 
selected randomly. The differences between my own ratings and the coder’s 
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ratings of the second set of articles was considerably less than in the first set. The 
two coders were college students with little specialized knowledge of Egypt, but 
enough general knowledge to understand its current political state, as well as the 
Arab Spring. Refer to pages 76-77 of the appendix for the specific comparisons 
between the coders’ ratings and my own.  
Ideally, more coders would have been involved if given more time and 
resources to locate credible coders. Even so, the comparisons were invaluable in 
aiding my refinement of my own coding process and in remembering to set aside 
the “extra” background knowledge I have on the topic of Egyptian journalism that 
most citizens reading the articles would not have. Additionally, the resultant data 
set would have been more conclusive if a greater quantity of articles had been 
coded. In this case, spending additional time coding articles would have 
unfortunately taken away from the level of analysis, as well as the depth of the 
thesis itself and the time taken to write it. Readers should be cautious of 
interpreting the findings as representative of absolute truths or causation. That 
being said, the 120-article data set establishes a strong basis for furthering the 
research and providing insight into how well and to what degree a paper’s 
character and the party in power can help predict the objectivity of an article. Due 
to the fact that causation cannot be drawn from this study, the thesis stands as a 
more exploratory project that sets groundwork for future research of media 
environments and the political conditions under which they exist.  
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FINDINGS  
 
Table 1: Statistics for Al-Ahram articles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Overall Political Security Culture 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ3) 
 
-0.80 -0.57 -0.23 0 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ4) 
 
-0.83 -0.33 -0.50 0 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ3) 
 
1.27 0.97 0.63 0 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ 4) 
 
1.39 1.03 0.82 0 
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Table 2: Statistics for Egypt Independent articles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Overall Political Security Culture 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ1) 
 
0.2 0.1 0.03 0.07 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ2) 
 
-0.56 -0.26 -0.43 0 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ1) 
 
1.42 0.99 0.18 0 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ2) 
 
1.21 0.91 0.96 0 
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Figure 2 
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T-tests determined whether the differences between means were significant in a 
majority of these hypotheses. Although some differences were not quite 
statistically significant, they closely approached it; therefore, differences that 
remain unconfirmed should not be ruled out. Instead, the implications of a 
possible significant difference, based upon a larger sample size for example, 
should be considered.  
 
SET I: DIFFERENCES ACROSS PAPERS  
 
This set of three hypotheses pertains to discrepancies in negativity demonstrated 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood across both two papers and two time periods.  
 
H1: Al-Ahram is, overall, more negative towards the Muslim Brotherhood than 
Egypt Independent is overall in both time periods. 
 
Μ 3 < Μ1: Confirmed. The difference between -0.80 and 0.2 is statistically 
significant. The overall mean rating of Egypt Independent during the Brotherhood 
Period is significantly more positive than that of Al-Ahram during the same time 
period. p= 0.0056 < 0.05; t= 2.88.  
 
Μ4 < Μ2: Unconfirmed. Although -0.83 is less than -0.56 the difference is not 
statistically significant. This can be said with a large amount of confidence 
because p= 0.43 > 0.1. The overall mean rating of Egypt Independent during the 
Post-Brotherhood period is not significantly more positive than that of Al-Ahram 
during the same time period.  
 
 
H2: The difference in negativity towards the Brotherhood between Al-Ahram and 
Egypt Independent will vary according to time period. The difference will be 
larger during the Brotherhood Period.  
 
|Μ3 – Μ1| > |Μ4- Μ2|: Confirmed. 1 > 0.27; H1 confirms that the difference 
between Egypt Independent and Al-Ahram during the Brotherhood period is 
significant, but the same cannot be said for the difference during the Post-
Brotherhood period. Thus, we can conclude that the difference between the 
dependent variable, Μ being negativity towards the Brotherhood, across papers is 
greater in the Brotherhood period than during the Post-Brotherhood period, during 
which Egypt Independent’s negativity, in each subcategory, more closely 
approaches that of Al-Ahram.  
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H3: In both time periods, Al-Ahram will be more negative towards the 
Brotherhood’s political, security, and cultural values than Egypt Independent is. 
From one time period to the next, the largest subcategorical differences between 
papers will be demonstrated by political ratings and security ratings. 
 
[Μ 3 < Μ1] Politics: Confirmed. The difference between -0.57 and 0.1 is 
statistically significant. Egypt Independent’s mean political rating is significantly 
more positive than that of Al-Ahram during the Brotherhood period.  
p= 0.011 < 0.05; t= 2.64 
 
[Μ 3 < Μ1] Security: Unconfirmed. Although -0.23 < 0.03, the difference is not 
statistically significant. Egypt Independent’s mean security rating is not 
significantly more positive than that of Al-Ahram during the Brotherhood period; 
however, the -0.20 is worth noting and researching further.  
 
[Μ 3 < Μ1] Culture: Unconfirmed. 0.07 is slightly greater than 0. The difference 
between the mean culture ratings of Egypt Independent and Al-Ahram during the 
Brotherhood Period is negligible and not statistically significant.  
 
[Μ 4 < Μ2] Politics: Unconfirmed. Although -0.33 is slightly less than -0.26, the 
difference is quite small and not statistically significant. Egypt Independent’s 
mean political rating is not significantly more positive than that of Al-Ahram 
during the Post-Brotherhood period. 
 
[Μ 4 < Μ2] Security: Unconfirmed. Although -0.50 is slightly less than -0.43, the 
difference is not statistically significant. Egypt Independent’s mean security rating 
is not significantly more positive than that of Al-Ahram during the Post-
Brotherhood period. 
 
[Μ 4 < Μ2] Culture: Unconfirmed. Both means equal 0. Across both paper and time 
period, the culture ratings show little variance. 
 
[|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Politics > [|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Culture:  
 
Confirmed. The number, 0.60, obtained by subtracting the difference in political 
ratings of Al-Ahram and Egypt Independent during the Post-Brotherhood period 
from that same difference during the Brotherhood period is much greater than the 
number, 0.07, obtained by doing the same for cultural ratings. This suggests that 
there is more variance in political scores across both paper and time period than 
there is in cultural scores, which tend to remain neutral.  
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[|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Security > [|Μ3– Μ1 | – |Μ 4 - Μ2 |] Culture: 
 
Confirmed: The number, 0.19, obtained by subtracting the difference in security 
ratings of Al-Ahram and Egypt Independent during the Post-Brotherhood period 
from that same difference during the Brotherhood period is greater than the 
number, 0, obtained by doing the same for cultural ratings. This suggests that 
there is more variance in security scores across both paper and time period than 
there is in cultural scores, but less variance in security scores than there is in 
political scores.  
 
 
 
SET I IMPLICATIONS  
 
Overall, Egypt Independent is significantly more positive than Al-Ahram 
in its ratings, but only during the Brotherhood period. According to the data sets, 
the difference between the overall scores of Egypt Independent and Al-Ahram 
during the Brotherhood period is almost four times greater than the same 
difference during the Post-Brotherhood period. Thus, the character of the paper 
(whether it is independent or not) is an accurate predictor of negativity only when 
the Brotherhood is in power. During the Brotherhood Period, only political ratings 
between papers vary significantly. Al-Ahram’s political ratings are much more 
negative than those of Egypt Independent. Although the difference between the 
security scores of Al-Ahram and Egypt Independent during the Brotherhood 
period is not statistically significant, it should still be considered as a noticeable 
difference. Security ratings, in this case, are still secondary for an additional 
reason. Political issues may have received the most coverage during the 
Brotherhood period simply because of the recent elections. Protests did not 
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significantly erupt again until the latter days of Morsi’s reign. Thus, it is logical 
that the media would prioritize political issues before security issues at this point.  
 
SET II: DIFFERENCES ACROSS TIME PERIODS 
 
This set of two hypotheses pertains to discrepancies in negativity demonstrated 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood by each individual publication across two time 
periods. 
 
H4:  Negativity towards the Muslim Brotherhood will change across time periods.  
 
Μ2 ≠ Μ1: Confirmed. The difference between -0.56 and 0.2 is statistically 
significant. Egypt Independent’s mean overall rating during the Brotherhood 
period is significantly more positive than its mean overall rating during the Post-
Brotherhood period. p=0.030 < 0.05; t= 2.23  
 
Μ4 ≠ Μ3: Unconfirmed: The difference between -0.83 and -0.80 is not 
statistically significant. It is negligible because -0.83 can be rounded to -0.80. 
Little variance in the overall mean rating of Al-Ahram from one time period to the 
next suggests that for the state-owned paper, the nature of the ruling regime (time 
period) is not as large of a factor in predicting negativity towards the Brotherhood 
in the I had expected it to be.  
 
 
H5: Both Al-Ahram and Egypt Independent will become more negative in their 
coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Post-Brotherhood Period. 
 
Μ2 < Μ1: Confirmed. The difference between -0.56 and 0.2, as explained above, 
is statistically significant. The same can be said for the mean security ratings, for 
which -0.43 < 0.03, p= 0.011, and t= 2.64. This suggests that for Egypt 
Independent, an independent publication, the party of the ruling regime (time 
period) is a necessary factor to consider in predicting its negativity towards the 
brotherhood.  
 
Μ4 < Μ3: Unconfirmed. The difference between -0.83 and -0.80 is negligible and 
not statistically significant. Al-Ahram’s overall mean rating remained fairly 
constant from one time period to the next, suggesting the party of the ruling 
regime isn’t a reliable factor for predicting negativity towards the Brotherhood.  
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H6: The political, security, and cultural scores of both Al-Ahram and Egypt 
Independent will become more negative in their coverage of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during the Post-Brotherhood Period. 
 
[Μ2 < Μ1] Political: Unconfirmed. The difference between -0.26 and 0.1 is not 
statistically significant. This can be said with a fair amount of confidence because 
p=0.14 > 0.1.  
 
[Μ2 < Μ1] Security: Confirmed. The difference between -0.43 and 0.03 is 
statistically significant. Egypt Independent’s security scores became increasingly 
more negative over time after Morsi was ousted. p=0.012; t=2.58 
 
[Μ2 < Μ1] Cultural: Unconfirmed. There is no significant difference between 0 and 
0.07. For Egypt Independent, there is little to no change in cultural scores 
overtime.  
 
[Μ4 < Μ3] Political: Unconfirmed. Al-Ahram actually becomes more positive in 
political ratings overtime as the average rating increases from -0.57 to -0.33. 
However, the difference is negligible because p= 0.36 > 0.1 and is most definitely 
not significant. There is little difference in Al-Ahram’s political ratings from one 
time period to the next.  
 
[Μ4 < Μ3] Security: Unconfirmed. Although -0.50 < -0.23, the difference is not 
statistically significant and this can be said with confidence because  
p= 0.16 > 0.1. There is little difference in Al-Ahram’s security ratings from one 
time period to the next.  
 
[Μ4 < Μ3] Cultural: Unconfirmed. During both time periods, Al-Ahram’s culture 
ratings remain neutral.  
 
 
 
SET II IMPLICATIONS  
 
Time period is a significant predictor of the negativity of both overall and 
security ratings for Egypt Independent but not for Al-Ahram. For Al-Ahram, none 
of the scores become significantly more negative after Morsi is ousted; instead, 
they remain negative and relatively constant. H6 indicates that for Egypt 
Independent scores, security ratings experience the largest shift in tone overtime. 
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Security ratings likely experienced the largest shift towards negativity after Morsi 
was ousted because of SCAF’s official statement deeming the Brotherhood a 
terrorist organization on Dec. 25th, 2013. This most likely prompted more 
frequent coverage of the Brotherhood’s status as a terrorist organization and in an 
unspoken way discouraged the independent publication from publishing 
viewpoints contrary to the government’s declaration (Habeeb 2012, 15). Doing so 
could have proven dangerous, especially because of the intense crackdown on 
Brotherhood members and the imprisonment of Morsi.  
 
 
SET III: DIFFERENCES AMONG SUBCATEGORIES 
 
This set of two hypotheses observes the discrepancies in negativity demonstrated 
towards the Muslim Brotherhood in each of three subcategories (political, 
security, and culture) across two publications and two time periods.  
 
H7: With time period and paper held constant in each of the 4 cases, the ratings 
for political, security, and culture values will not be equal. Political and security 
ratings will be more negative than culture ratings.  
 
Μ1Political < Μ1Culture: Unconfirmed. 0.1 is not less than 0.07.  This suggests that 
Egypt Independent’s cultural and political scores during the Brotherhood Period 
were not significantly positive or negative and that, on average, they both 
remained relatively neutral towards the Brotherhood.  
 
Μ1Security < Μ1Culture: Unconfirmed. Although 0.03 is slightly less than 0.07, the 
difference is exceedingly small and not statistically significant. Similarly to Egypt 
Independent’s mean political score during the Brotherhood period, its mean 
security score during this time is also fairly neutral.  
 
Μ2Political < Μ2Culture: Unconfirmed:  The difference between -0.26 and 0 is not 
statistically significant. This can be said with a large degree of confidence 
because p= 0.12 > 0.1. Even so, the difference should be acknowledged as an 
indicator of Egypt Independent’s greater coverage of political than cultural issues 
during the Post-Brotherhood period.  
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Μ2Security < Μ2Culture: Confirmed. The difference between -0.43 and 0 is 
statistically significant. p= 0.017 < 0.05; t=2.45. Egypt Independent’s mean 
security score during the Post-Brotherhood Period is significantly more negative 
than its mean culture score. This suggests both that security issues receive greater 
coverage during this time and that the paper’s level of negativity towards the 
Brotherhood’s security values needs to be analyzed further.  
 
Μ3Political < Μ3Culture: Confirmed. The difference between -0.57 and 0 is 
statistically significant. p= 0.0021 < 0.05; t=3.22. Al-Ahram’s mean political score 
during the Brotherhood Period is significantly more negative than its mean 
cultural score. This indicates greater coverage of political issues and encourages a 
closer look at the significance of Al-Ahram’s level of negativity towards the 
Brotherhood’s political values.  
 
Μ3Security < Μ3Culture: Confirmed. The difference between -0.23 and 0 is exactly on 
the cusp of being statistically significant. p= 0.05; t= 2.0. We will assume that if 
the sample size was slightly larger, Al-Ahram’s mean security rating during the 
Brotherhood Period would be significantly more negative than its cultural rating. 
 
Μ4Political < Μ4Culture: Unconfirmed. Although -0.33 is noticeably less than 0, the 
difference is not statistically significant. p= 0.068 > 0.05; t= 1.86. However, since 
p < 0.1, there is a possibility that had the sample size been larger, Al-Ahram’s 
political scores during the Post-Brotherhood period would have been significantly 
more negative than the culture scores.  
 
Μ4Security < Μ4Culture: Confirmed. The difference between -0.50 and 0 is 
statistically significant. p= 0.0015 < 0.05; t=3.34. Al-Ahram’s mean security score 
during the Post-Brotherhood Period is significantly more negative than its mean 
cultural score. This indicates greater coverage of security issues than cultural 
issues and shows that in terms of security topics, Al-Ahram is not neutral towards 
the Muslim Brotherhood during this time period.  
 
 
 
 
SET III IMPLICATIONS  
 
There is almost no variance in the culture scores for each paper during 
both time periods. Culture scores remained consistently neutral and in only two 
cases, received slightly above and below neutral scores, resulting in a mean score 
of 0.07 for Egypt Independent during the Brotherhood period. After reading each 
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article and rating it according to the three categories, it was apparent that the 
majority of articles did not focus on cultural issues. Hence, they received a “0” 
not because they covered culture neutrally, but because issues relevant to culture 
were discussed minimally, if at all. This indicates that political and security issues 
were of greater concern for both papers, during both time periods. The difference 
between cultural, political, and security scores is smallest for Egypt Independent 
during the Brotherhood period. Political and security issues were definitely given 
attention, unlike culture issues, but they were often covered neutrally; hence, there 
is a difference between the neutral political and security scores and the neutral 
cultural scores.  
Overall, cultural topics, including social rights and women rights in 
particular, are not discussed by either publication for two possible reasons. Firstly, 
it is possible that such issues spark little debate or concern because they are not a 
problem in that society. Conversely, it is also possible that authority figures look 
down upon or even condemn dialogue critiquing such culturally sensitive issues. I 
lean towards the second possibility. Regardless, lack of coverage of a topic does 
not automatically entail society’s lack of concern for it.  
 
 
SET IV: OVERALL DIFFERENCES AMONG MEANS   
This set of hypotheses reveals the nature of the project in the lens of the largest 
scope. This hypothesis attempts to explain the broader picture by comparing each 
mean to the average of the other three.  
 
H8: The overall, political, and security scores of Egypt Independent during the 
Brotherhood Period and the overall, political, and security scores of Al-Ahram 
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during the Post-Brotherhood Period will stand out significantly among the other 
90 respective scores. Egypt Independent’s overall, political, and security scores 
will be significantly more positive than the rest, while Al-Ahram’s overall, 
political, and security scores during the Post-Brotherhood period will be more 
negative than the rest.  
 
Μ1 > M (M2 + M3 + M4): Confirmed. The difference between the overall scores, 0.2 
and -0.78, is extremely significant. p= 0.0006 < 0.05; t= 3.55. The political ratings 
of Egypt Independent, during the Brotherhood period, like the overall ratings, are 
also significantly more positive than the rest. p=0.019 < 0.05; t=2.38 
 
 
M4 < M (M1 + M2 + M3): Unconfirmed. The difference between -0.83 and -0.39 is 
not statistically significant. Al-Ahram’s mean ratings during the Post-Brotherhood 
period are not significantly more negative than the average of the other 90 scores.  
 
 
SET IV IMPLICATIONS 
In comparison to the average of the other ninety ratings, only those of 
Egypt Independent during the Brotherhood Period stood out significantly among 
the rest. Of those scores, the overall and political scores were significantly more 
positive than those same sets of scores from the other 90 articles.  Since Al-
Ahram’s negativity towards the Brotherhood during neither the Brotherhood 
Period nor the Post-Brotherhood period, is significant in comparison to the mean 
of the other ninety scores, it appears as though the tone of the state-owned paper 
was not affected by the change in presidency. I interpret this as suggesting that 
although Morsi was elected to office, the military retained influence over media 
during both time periods. In the Brotherhood Period, Al-Ahram is significantly 
more negative towards the Muslim Brotherhood than Egypt Independent, which is 
almost neutral towards the Brotherhood at this time. In this particular instance, the 
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state-owned paper is curiously more negative towards the regime in power. This 
finding is interesting for two main reasons.  
Firstly, Al-Ahram’s negativity towards the Muslim Brotherhood, to which 
the president belongs, during Morsi’s presidency problematizes the commonly 
held assumption that state-owned papers tend to favor the party in power. In this 
case, during the Brotherhood period, the state-owned paper appears to be an organ 
of the old regime, SCAF. This prompts the question: What is the role of a state-
owned paper if it is not promoting the state’s political leader? Does this only 
occur under Islamist regimes?  
Secondly, the significance of the degree to which Egypt 
Independent’s political and overall scores are more positive than the rest (Egypt 
Independent during the Post-Brotherhood period and Al-Ahram during both 
periods) suggests the possibility that the presence of Islamists in government does 
not have a significant effect on the neutrality of an independent paper.  For those 
who believe democracy and Islamism are incompatible, the independent press’ 
relative objectivity may also come as a surprise. On the contrary, it is also 
possible that the Brotherhood’s time in office was simply cut short and as a result, 
they lacked the momentum necessary to noticeably influence media. In other 
words, if Morsi had been in power for a longer period of time, perhaps the 
independent press would not be as objective.  
 Additionally, Egypt Independent’s almost neutral tone towards the 
Brotherhood, during the Brotherhood period, insinuates one of two possible 
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implications. Firstly, it is possible that the Brotherhood had insufficient time to 
affect the independent publication, as discussed above. Secondly, it is also 
possible that the Brotherhood was exercising significant influence on the 
independent publication and that had it not, Egypt Independent would have 
covered the Brotherhood more negatively as opposed to neutrally. Pressure from 
the Brotherhood to avoid covering it in a negative light may have been present. 
Although we have no way of knowing for certain, the second option deserves 
more skepticism. Al-Ahram’s negative coverage of the Brotherhood while Morsi 
was in power suggests that the Islamist government simply did not have the 
ability to affect media during this time. If it had the ability to affect media, the 
state-owned publication would have logically been the first to model favorable 
coverage of the ruling regime. And this was not the case.  
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SUMMARY & CONCLUSION  
 
 As a future journalist, the objective dissemination of information is of 
great concern to me. Objectivity and honesty in journalism is invaluable, 
especially in countries that are politically unstable and at times repressive— 
countries such as Egypt. The shutting down of Egypt Independent’s print version 
in 2013 shows how independent, and perhaps dissenting views, are being 
repressed; however, the source of repression and reason for it is oftentimes not 
immediately transparent. After Egypt Independent’s print version was shut down, 
the editors founded a new publication called Mada-Masr, which The Guardian 
has since dubbed “the news website that’s keeping press freedom alive in Egypt” 
(Chang 2015, 1).  The title of the article alone hints that press freedom in Egypt is 
in danger.  
 After hand coding one hundred and twenty articles, which were divided 
into four subsections based on character of paper (independent or state-owned) 
and time period (Brotherhood in power or Post-Brotherhood), some shifts in 
negativity towards the Brotherhood were significantly apparent. Though the 
causes for such shifts cannot be isolated for certain, the two independent 
variables, being character of paper and time period, should be regarded as tools 
for predicting negativity towards the Brotherhood. The two independent variables 
are broad in scope, but serve as a necessary first step to assessing the media 
environment of Egypt under certain basic conditions.  
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 According to the data, time period is a significant indicator of negativity 
towards the Brotherhood only for the independent publication, Egypt 
Independent. For this publication, the mean security category ratings were 
primarily responsible for the shift, as they grew significantly more negative 
during the Post-Brotherhood Period after Morsi was ousted from office. Security 
ratings likely became more negative because of the el-Sisi’s official statement 
made on Dec. 25th, 2013, which declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist 
organization and thus began a crackdown on group members. Upon being ousted, 
Morsi was arrested and imprisoned (Habeeb 2012, 15). 
 Complimenting this finding, the character of the paper (independent or 
state-owned) was only significant for the Brotherhood period. During Morsi’s 
presidency, Al-Ahram’s political ratings were significantly more negative than 
those of Egypt Independent. Though security issues were of most concern during 
the Post-Brotherhood Period, after Morsi was imprisoned and protests erupted 
again, political concerns proved to be top priority during the Brotherhood period. 
There are countless explanations for this topical focus. The most plausible has to 
do with the ongoing political struggle between SCAF and the Muslim 
Brotherhood upon Morsi’s election to office.  
  In fact, it is possible that SCAF was acting “behind the scenes” even 
during Morsi’s time in office. Two particular findings support this explanation. 
Firstly, there is no significant difference between Al-Ahram’s ratings during the 
Brotherhood Period or after it. The publication maintained a rather constant 
	  58	  
negativity in both political and security ratings overtime. Contrary to common 
assumption, this suggests that the state-owned paper, Al-Ahram, was not 
supporting the party in power during the Brotherhood period. This implies 
remnants of loyalty to the previous source of political power, SCAF. Secondly, 
because time period is a significant indicator of negativity for Egypt Independent, 
which becomes more negative overtime, but not for Al-Ahram, it is evident that 
the scores of the independent and state-owned publications begin to merge with 
each other. The intersecting scores could indicate an increase in self-censorship 
on behalf of the independent paper after Morsi was ousted and SCAF regained 
power. On the contrary, Egypt Independent may have censored itself during the 
Brotherhood period if the Brotherhood pressured it to refrain from negative 
coverage. However, I am more inclined to believe that self-censorship became 
more prevalent during the Post-Brotherhood period because of the simultaneous 
drop in security ratings and condemnation of Brotherhood supporters by the 
military.  
 Most interestingly, these findings suggest that state-owned papers do not 
always support the state’s leading party, seriously putting into question the role of 
state-owned papers in hybrid regimes. The fact that Egypt’s first freely elected 
president was Islamist is especially compelling and more research would be 
required to determine whether state-owned papers act uncharacteristically in other 
political environments. In particular, it would be most informative to observe the 
character of state-owned papers in political environments where Islamists have 
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not been included in government bodies and contrastingly, where Islamist 
government is regarded as the status quo. These additional observations could 
help discern whether the Islamist nature of government plays a role in the state-
owned papers’ refusal to support the state’s ruling party. On the surface, it may 
seem as though the ruling party has full control over the state, but in reality, there 
are often other significant players working behind the scenes. For Egypt, SCAF 
likely retained much of its power over Egypt even after Morsi was elected to 
office.  
 Additionally, the prevalence of self-censorship in hybrid regimes and the 
repercussions if such censorship is not achieved requires further research. For 
example, Egypt Independent’s coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood’s security 
values became significantly more negative after Morsi was ousted and SCAF 
regained power; however, we cannot isolate SCAF or el-Sisi as the catalyst or 
cause of the independent paper’s self-censorship. Even if SCAF is the culprit, it 
remains unclear as to whether the same self-censorship would occur under a 
previously ruling regime that was not so closely associated with the nation’s 
military. It is also unclear as to whether the same results would occur if the 
military were weak. Is Egypt Independent’s shift in negativity a result of SCAF’s 
desire to gain popularity by criticizing the Islamist opponent or are there other 
motivations involved? Furthermore, would the same shift in negativity occur if 
the prior regime were run by Islamists and not by the military?   
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The data I have collected from the cohort of 120 articles suggests that both 
the character of the paper and time period are factors that should be taken into 
account while determining the objectivity of a paper during a given time period. 
Most significantly, Egypt Independent’s slant in coverage of the Brotherhood 
began to approach that of the state-owned paper, Al-Ahram, after Morsi was 
ousted from office. The decreasing differentiation between the two papers is a 
testament to the threats faced by independent journalism in Egypt. The 
independent publication became more negative during the Post-Brotherhood 
Period, but we cannot immediately attribute military rule to less neutral coverage 
on behalf of independent papers.  
 To understand how future research can improve and build upon this thesis, 
it is important to consider limitations. The biggest limitation confronted in the 
process is the number of articles coded, as well as the small number of additional 
coders. These particular setbacks made it impossible to ensure one hundred 
percent coding reliability on my part. If given more time, I would have not only 
hired more coders and coded more articles, but I would have also expanded upon 
my scope of research. From a broader perspective, this research prompts further 
study not only of other nations with hybrid regimes. Also, analysis of a set of 
nations where the military plays varying roles would shed light on the more 
specific political conditions under which independent and state-owned media will 
intersect in their slant of coverage.  
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Additionally, as opposed to observing only Egypt, I would have taken a 
look at more Arab Spring nations and gathered data on their collective coverage 
of Islamists to gauge domestic support for and varying representations of Islamist 
parties. From there, I would like to expand upon the concept of press freedom and 
how it may, or may not, be increasingly endangered in spite of globalization and 
greater accessibility to news through multimedia platforms.  
Most broadly, this thesis constitutes one step towards determining whether 
media dynamics are environment-specific. In the past, the media dynamics of 
both democratic and authoritarian nations have been studied in-depth, but 
categorizing nations’ regimes is not always a precise process. Certain nations, 
such as Egypt, do not fall neatly into the democratic or the authoritarian genre but 
nevertheless deserve the same level of attention for the sake of defining the 
varying natures of media environments around the world. Assessing any given 
media environment and the variables that affect its dynamics is pertinent to 
eventually confronting and mending its flaws. Although Egypt is just one small 
piece of the puzzle, this research provides a starting point from which the 
influences on Egyptian press may become more transparent to both journalists 
and audiences alike.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Table	  1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Egypt Independent Al-Ahram  
Brotherhood Period 
July 2012 & January 2013 Μ 1 Μ3 
Post-Brotherhood Period  
July 2013 & January 2014 Μ 2 Μ 4 
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FINDINGS 	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Overall Political Security Culture 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ3) 
 
-0.80 -0.57 -0.23 0 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ4) 
 
-0.83 -0.33 -0.50 0 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ3) 
 
1.27 0.97 0.63 0 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ 4) 
 
1.39 1.03 0.82 0 
Findings: Table 1: Statistics for Al-Ahram articles  	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Table 2: Statistics for Egypt Independent articles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
 Overall Political Security Culture 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ1) 
 
0.2 0.1 0.03 0.07 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(Μ2) 
 
-0.56 -0.26 -0.43 0 
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ1) 
 
1.42 0.99 0.18 0 
Post-
Brotherhood 
Period 
(σ2) 
 
1.21 0.91 0.96 0 
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CODING DATA CHARTS 
	  
	  
	  
Al-­‐Ahram	  Coding	  July	  2012	  
	   	   Politics	   Security	   Culture	   Overall	  1	   1	   0	   0	   1	  2	   1	   0	   0	   1	  3	   1	   0	   0	   1	  4	   0	   0	   0	   0	  5	   0	   0	   0	   0	  6	   0	   0	   0	   0	  7	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  8	   0	   0	   0	   0	  9	   0	   0	   0	   0	  10	   0	   0	   0	   0	  11	   0	   0	   0	   0	  12	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	  13	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  14	   0	   0	   0	   0	  15	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	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Al-­‐Ahram	  Coding	  January	  2013	  	   	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  2	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  3	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  4	  	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  5	   0	   0	   0	   0	  6	   0	   0	   0	   0	  7	  	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  8	  	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐3	  9	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  10	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  11	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  12	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐3	  13	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  14	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  15	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  70	  
Al-­‐Ahram	  Coding	  July	  2013	  	   	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   2	   0	   0	   2	  2	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  3	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  4	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  5	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  6	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  7	   0	   0	   0	   0	  8	  	   0	   0	   0	   0	  9	   0	   0	   0	   0	  10	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	  11	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  12	   -­‐3	   0	   0	   -­‐3	  13	   0	   0	   0	   0	  14	   0	   0	   0	   0	  15	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	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Al-­‐Ahram	  Coding	  January	  2014	   	  	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐3	  2	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐4	  3	   0	   0	   0	   0	  4	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  5	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  6	   0	   0	   0	   0	  7	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  8	   +1	   +1	   0	   +2	  9	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  10	   0	   0	   0	   0	  11	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  12	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  13	   0	   0	   0	   0	  14	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  15	   0	   0	   0	   0	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Egypt	  Independent	  Coding	  July	  2012	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  2	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  3	   1	   0	   2	   3	  4	   0	   0	   0	   0	  5	   1	   0	   0	   1	  6	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  7	   1	   0	   0	   1	  8	   2	   0	   0	   2	  9	   1	   0	   0	   1	  10	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  11	   0	   0	   0	   0	  12	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	  13	   0	   0	   0	   0	  14	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	  15	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	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Egypt	  Independent	  Coding	  January	  2013	  	  	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   2	   1	   1	   4	  2	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  3	   0	   0	   0	   0	  4	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  5	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  6	   0	   0	   0	   0	  7	   0	   0	   0	   0	  8	   0	   0	   2	   +2	  9	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	  10	   0	   0	   0	   0	  11	   0	   0	   0	   0	  12	   0	   0	   +1	   +1	  13	   +2	   0	   0	   +2	  14	   0	   0	   0	   0	  15	   0	   0	   0	   0	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Egypt	  Independent	  Coding	  July	  2013	  	  	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  2	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  3	   1	   0	   0	   1	  4	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  5	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  6	   0	   +1	   0	   +1	  7	   1	   0	   0	   1	  8	   0	   0	   0	   0	  9	   0	   0	   0	   0	  10	   0	   0	   0	   0	  11	   0	   0	   0	   0	  12	   0	   0	   0	   0	  13	   -­‐3	   0	   0	   -­‐3	  14	   0	   -­‐3	   0	   -­‐3	  15	   0	   0	   0	   0	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Egypt	  Independent	  Coding	  January	  2014	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Politics	   Security	  	   Culture	  	   Overall	  	  1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  2	   0	   0	   0	   0	  3	   0	   0	   0	   0	  4	  	   0	   0	   0	   0	  5	   0	   0	   0	   0	  6	   0	   0	   0	   0	  7	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  8	   0	   0	   0	   0	  9	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  10	   0	   0	   0	   0	  11	   0	   0	   0	   0	  12	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  13	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	  14	   -­‐3	   0	   0	   -­‐3	  15	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	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Coding For Reliability: Set I 
 	   P	  [H]	   S	  [H]	   C	  [H]	   O	  [H]	   P	  [1]	   S	  [1]	   C	  [1]	   O	  [1]	   P	  [2]	   S	  [2]	   C	  [2]	   O	  [2]	  1	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐4	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐3	  2	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐3	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐2	  3	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐4	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  4	   0	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   1	   0	   0	   1	  5	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  6	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   1	   0	   2	   3	   0	   0	   3	   3	  7	   +1	   +1	   0	   +2	   1	   1	   0	   2	   1	   0	   1	   2	  8	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	  9	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  10	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   0	   1	   2	  11	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐3	   -­‐3	   0	   -­‐6	   -­‐1	   -­‐3	   0	   -­‐4	  12	   1	   0	   0	   1	   2	   0	   3	   5	   1	   0	   3	   4	  13	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	  14	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  15	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐3	   -­‐3	   0	   0	   -­‐3	  16	   0	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  17	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   0	   1	   2	   -­‐3	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐4	  18	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	  19	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   1	   2	   3	   0	   1	   4	  20	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	  
 
* Where P= political scores, S= security scores, C= cultural scores and O= overall 
scores. My scores are identified with “[H]” while “[1]” and “[2]” represent the 
scores determined by my additional coders.  
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Coding For Reliability: Set II 
 	   P	  [H]	   S	  [H]	   C	  [H]	   O	  [H]	   P	  [S]	   S	  [S]	   C	  [S]	   O	  [S]	  1	   -­‐2	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐4	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  2	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  3	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	  4	   +1	   0	   0	   +1	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  5	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐3	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	  6	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  7	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐2	  8	   2	   0	   0	   2	   2	   0	   0	   2	  9	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  10	   -­‐2	   0	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	  11	   0	   0	   2	   2	   0	   0	   2	   2	  12	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  13	   1	   0	   2	   3	   1	   0	   1	   2	  14	   2	   1	   1	   4	   1	   2	   2	   5	  15	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  16	   0	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   0	   -­‐2	  17	   0	   +1	   0	   +1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  18	   0	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   0	   -­‐1	  19	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  20	   0	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐3	   0	   -­‐4	  
 
* This is the second round of sample coding, completed only Coder 1.  
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